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Calendar
,January 6.-Denver Bar Association regular monthly meeting, 12:15 p.m.,
Chamber of Commerce dining room, E. Blythe Stason, Dean of the
University of Michigan Law School, Speaker.
February 3.-Denver Bar Association regular monthly meeting, 12:15 p.m.,

Chamber of Commerce dining room, Hon. J. W. Delehant, United
States District Judge, District of Nebraska, Speaker.

Labor Relations and the Lawyer t
By

JEAN

S.

BREITENSTEIN *

Since it was announced that I would speak upon the assigned topic, I
I have received numerous suggestions as to what I should or should not discuss. These have covered the full range from an elementary outline to guide
those who have had little experience in the labor field to the idea that I
should present an analysis of some of the highly technical problems that currently confront those who actively engage in counseling large corporations
in labor matters.
The present interest in the soft coal strike has led me to believe that
perhaps a more timely presentation might result from an analysis of some
of the causes of present day labor strife and a discussion of some of the proposed remedies. In arriving at such conclusion I may have been presumptuous.
I fully realize that the subjects are controversial and that many of you may
disagree with me.
First as to the causes. Attention has oft been directed by able writers
to the fact that the United States has existed and progressed under two contradictory philosophies-on the one hand that of political democracy and on
the other that of a capitalistic economy. For many years-until about 1930
-capitalism was in the ascendancy. However, our political democracy demanded the imposition of gradually increasing controls designed to curb the
growing power of big business. These controls took the form of such laws
as the Interstate Commerce Act, the Sherman Anti-trust Act, the act creating the Federal Reserve System, and the Securities Act.
'An address before the Denver Bar Association, Dec. 9, 1946.

*Of the Denver bar.
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The stock market crash of 1929 and the depression which followed
brought to an end the ascendancy of capital. From then organized labor has
assumed powers which have increased with each succeeding year. Labor has
accomplished this through the operation of our system of political democracy.
In rapid succession Congress passed such laws as the Norris-La Guardia Act,
the Wagner Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act. The U. S. Supreme
Court, by way of any assist, held in the Hutcheson case that labor unions
were immune from prosecution under the anti-trust laws, in the Thornhill
case that peaceful picketing was a constitutionally protected right, and in the
Darby case that the field of interstate commerce encompassed many matters
previously thought to be the sole concern of the states.
With capital deprived of the weapon of injunction and labor provided
with the protective armoring of collective bargaining, the balance of power
inevitably shifted to organized labor. A friendly national administration did
nothing to discourage the unions in their demands. A change in personnel
of our highest court resulted in decisions removing certain hazards-such as
the fear of anti-trust prosecutions.
The natural result was to create in organized labor a group power, the
like of which had never before confronted the U. S. The expanding unions
pyramided in a manner that far exceeded the holding company activities of
certain capitalists in the 1920's. No longer was there a situation of local
unions dealing with local employers. Industry wide organizations, including
in their membership all employees of the industry contracted with the entire
industry upon the basis of one master contract. When this point was reached,
the unions were in a position to monopolize and to restrain trade in a manner
and to an extent never conceived by the creators of the great business trusts.
There has resulted, in part at least from the causes outlined, a situation
wherein a union dominated by one man can entirely disrupt the economy of
the nation. What are we going to do about it? A great variety of remedies
has been suggested. Let us briefly examine a few of them.
Some people urge the outlawing of all strikes. Such action would seem
to require the simultaneous outlawing of all lockouts. This proposal runs directly contrary to the philosophies under which our country has operated
for over 150 years. The right to strike is a right precious to labor just as the
right to lockout is a right precious to the employer. However, the right to
strike and the right to lockout are relative, not absolute, rights. The interests
of the public transcend either the interests of labor or the interests of capital.
If strikes and lockouts are to be outlawed then some method must be
devised for the settlement of controversies between employers and employees
which are incapable of voluntary agreement. This involves some sort of
compulsory arbitration-that is, some federal agency must be created to perform the functions which during the late war were performed by the War
Labor Board and its various agencies. It is difficult to believe that any who
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adhere to our tradition of a political democracy and a free competitive system can ever agree to compulsory arbitration of such matters as hours, wages
and working conditions. Unless freedom of contract is to be entirely discarded, these fundamental issues must be left to voluntary agreement. Both
labor and management must resist any attempt to delegate to a governmental
agency the power of decision in these matters. If in a period free from a
national emergency such as the late war, a federal bureau can write the ticket
as to wages, hours and working conditions, then we have come to the end of
the road for both free enterprise and organized labor. Instead we have a
collectivist state-call it socialistic, fascistic or what you will.
It may be argued that so far as the so-called natural monopolies are concerned, i. e., industries in which the charges to the consumers are within the
control of some public body, it is essential that the power to strike or lockout
be entirely eliminated. The difficulty is that many industries are just as essential to the public welfare as are those in which the ultimate charges are
completely regulated. The current coal strike is a good example.
The answer would seem to lie in the 6reation of an agency of mediation
or conciliation, to which notices of strikes or lockouts must be given, with
appropriate provisions for that agency to forbid strikes or lockouts until
after a suitable cooling off period during which an impartial investigation
should be made, with adequate provision for publicizing all pertinent facts.
Consideration might further be given to authorizing such board to apply for
an injunction against the threatened strike or lockout in the event the board
should make an appropriate finding that the public interest would be damaged. However, unless our political ideals and philosophies are to be discarded, this power should not extend to the compulsory arbitration of matters affecting wages, hours and working conditions. This must be left to
agreement between the employer and the employees.
Another popular suggestion is that industry wide or area wide strikes
should be prohibited by law. This idea carries with it as a necessary premise
the idea that collective bargaining contracts should not be on a basis of either
an entire industry or an entire area. Such a suggestion runs contrary to a
well developed trend that has existed for many years. Both unions and employers have in recent years joined with other unions and other employers
in an effort to combat the common opposition. Such organization among
the unions is well known to you all. Perhaps the organizations of employers,
because not as well publicized, are not as well known. Here in Denver we
have the Mountain States Employers Council, an organization of the employers in the Rocky Mountain area, which has as its purpose unified action
by industry in dealing with labor. These organized groups of employers are
to a great extent for the benefit of the small employer who individually does
not have the influence or the financial strength to combat strong and well
heeled labor organizations. The big employers can take care of themselves
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to a great extent. But their positions are immeasurably weakened when the
unions are able to obtain concessions from the little fellows who are too weak
to fight and then contend that these concessions should be adopted by the
entire industry. So there is an advantage both to the small and the large
employer in coordinating their activities through organized effort.
Obviously if the right to take concerted action is denied to the unions
it must be denied to the employers. Certainly it is arguable as to whether
or not any ultimate good to the public will result from any prohibition of
industry wide or area wide collective bargaining, strikes or lockouts.
Instead it would seem that the remedy lies in another direction. The
principles of the Sherman Act should be made applicable to combinations
of labor unions and of labor unions and employers. The decision of the
U. S. Supreme Court in the Hutcheson case was based entirely upon the
construction and application of the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act and the
Norris-La Guardia Act. Labor unions have no constitutionally guaranteed
right to monopolize or restrain trade. The existing immunity of labor
unions to prosecutions for combining to create monopolies or to restrain trade
should be removed by Congressional legislation. When this is done, then
the problem of industry or area wide strikes or lockouts will disappear.
Another popular idea is that the closed or union shop should be prohibited by law. Even a cursory analysis of this proposal discloses that it is
no remedy. Contractual recognition of a closed shop, a union shop, a maintenance of membership shop or an open shop means little. They affect only
that tenuous subject of union security. A strike can occur and often in the
past has occurred just as readily in an industry having an open shop contract
as in one having a closed shop contract. And strangely enough there are
employers who take the position that if their business is going to be organized
by a union it is preferable to have a closed or union shop. Certain union
negotiations are made easier. The charge of union discrimination may be
easily denied. And perhaps in some cases the recruiting of new employees
is facilitated. However, most employers take the position that under American political philosophy an employee should be free to join or refrain fro"
joining a union as he may see fit-in other words that union membership.,
must not be a condition of employment. Certainly this principle may not
be denied without at the same time denying the validity of some of our
fundamental concepts of individual rights.
While it would seem that a prohibition of a closed shop is no solution of
the basic problem of labor relations, it is at the same time apparent that the
right to a closed shop is one which should be so circumscribed as to conform
to American ideals. It might well be provided by appropriate legislation that
there may be neither a closed shop nor a maintenance of membership clause
in a labor contract unless four conditions are satisfied, viz:
1. The union must have as members at least 75 percent of those employees sought to be covered by the agreement;
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2. The agreement must be ratified by at least 60 percent of all such
employees by secret ballot;
3. Any person employed or seeking empolyment must be admitted to
union membership on terms available to at least a majority of the existing
membership; and
4. No person may be deprived of union membership except on written
charges and after a fair hearing.
So much for the closed shop. Let us now turn to another subject of ever
present importance-the right of collective bargaining and what should be
done about the Wagner Act. At this stage it is a waste of words to argue
about the right of collective bargaining. Its general acceptance must be
recognized. The question is thus narrowed to a consideration of what should
be done about the Wagner Act and here again the issue is largely confined
to a discussion of what should be done to equalize the responsibility and power
on both sides of the collective bargaining table. In this probably lies the
best chance for sound and constructive federal labor legislation.
The Wagner Act took a one sided view of the problem. Rights were
created in favor of labor. Employers were prohibited against engaging in
certain practices which were declared to be unfair. No corresponding rights
were recognized in industry and unions were made liable for no unfair practices. In other words, one side was restricted in its activities while the other
was left free to do what it chose. The result should have been apparent
at the time of the enactment of the legislation. But on top of the legislation
itself there has been the administration of the law by the National Labor
Board which has been declared by board members to have been slanted in
favor of labor.
All this adds up to the conclusion that the Wagner Act must be amended
so as to provide some fair and suitable basis for the operation of the recog
nized right of collective bargaining.
The most important aspect of this problem concerns the mutual responsibility of the labor unions and the employers and the mutual enforceability of labor contracts. If such mutuality does not exist, then what good
are the collectively bargained contracts. And let it be noted here that the
problem is not one sided. Much has been said about the lack of responsibility of unions. Consider the other side of the picture. What is a labor
union to do if the employer fails to comply with a contract which does not
contain a provision for arbitration. And what is the labor union to do if the
contract provides for arbitration and the employer refuses to arbitrate. In
many instances it may be that the only effective remedy of the union is to
strike and this in itself may be a violation of the contract. And when you
have a contract breached by each party where do you stand.
The point is that it is just as much in the interest of labor as it is in the
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interest of capital to have mutual responsibility under mutually enforceable
contracts. Several obvious remedies immediately became apparent. A labor
union should be a legal entity capable of suing and being sued. Unions should
be required to file annually public statements showing their assets, liabilities
and officers. But of paramount importance there should be some method of
compulsory arbitration provided either by contract or by appropriate legislation for the settlement of disputes arising under labor contracts. Such an
arbitration should not include the power to either add to or subtract from
the labor contract, but should include the power to construe and apply the
contract and enforce decisions by appropriate methods.
Mutual contract responsibility is not the only subject for consideration
when amendments to the Wagner Act are considered. Secondary boycotts
and jurisdictional strikes should be eliminated. And of primary importance
is the establishment of a code of what constitutes unfair labor practices on
the part of labor unions. The existing law defines unfair labor practices on
the part of employers. Specifically the Wagner Act might well be amended
to provide that it would be an unfair labor practice for a group of employees
or a union to engage in any of the following:
1. A strike, work stoppage or slow down during the cooling off period
preceding a strike or in violation of a collective bargaining contract;
2. Seizure of or damage to property during any labor dispute;
3. Use of such threats of violence as mass picketing, blocking access to a
place of business or interfering with the use of a public highway;
4. Withdrawal of essential maintenance employees in any labor dispute
where the result may be to jeopardize the safety of persons or property;
5. A secondary boycott;
6. A strike or other coercive action to influence employees in their
choice of bargaining representatives;
7. A strike or other coercive action to compel recognition as bargaining
agent by an employer prior to certification as such bargaining agent.
Perhaps other undesirable practices mgiht be added. The list given is
at least explanatory of the type of activity which might well be forbidden to
labor unions.
Other amendments to the Wagner Act worthy of consideration relate to
a redefinitoin of the term employee so as to exclude supervisory employees
and to the safeguarding of the employer's right to free speech. This last
should not be necessary but the position taken by the NLRB and the courts
indicate the desirability of positive legislation. Also if the investigating,
prosecuting and judicial functions of the board are not adequately separated
by the recently enacted administrative practice act, provision might well be
made for their complete independence.
If the revisions suggested are made in the Wagner Act, it would
seem that some sort of a labor court should be created to enforce labor con-

DICTA
tracts but not to write labor contracts and determine controversies involving
unfair practices on the part of either employers or employees. For such a
court to be of any value it must be so set up that impartiality, integrity and
high class personnel are assured.
Turning now from the Wagner Act and what can be done to render it
really workable, consideration must be given to the subject of how can labor
be prevented from taking over the functions of management. Some argue
that labor should take over management but I believe we all recognize that
when and if that happens we have come to the end of our established system
of free competitive enterprise. On this question the answer would seem to
lie not in legislation but in a firm stand by management against contractual
encroachments by labor upon the functions and responsibilities of management. If the rules can be clarified so that the government is no longer an
active participant on the union side of the table but merely an umpire,
employers will have a better chance in maintaining their prerogatives. The
representatives of industry may not abdicate their duty and responsibility to
manage the enterprise in which they are engaged. To this end they must
resist the incorporation into labor contracts of clauses designed to weaken
management. I have reference to such matters as mutual consent clauses,
joint committees, unlimited arbitration and seniority provisions which eliminate qualifications and competence. If management supinely yields to labor
on these matters then it does not deserve to manage.
Thus far we have considered the mechanics or procedures of labor relations. One subject of a somewhat different nature should be mentioned.
I refer to the Fair Labor Standards Act. There would seem to be room for
much improvement here. Of great current interest is the June 1946 decision
of the U. S. Supreme Court in the Mt. Clemens Pottery Company case
wherein the portal to portal doctrine was enlarged to the time clock doctrine
with employers held subject to overtime payments for time spent in walking
to the working place and in getting out tools and putting on the equipment
needed for particular tasks. Wage suits aggregating millions of dollars have
resulted from this decision. Without going into detail it would seem that
much thought should be given to amending the Fair Labor Standards Act so
as to eliminate (1) uncertainty as to coverage, (2) uncertainty as to exemptions, (3) uncertainty in meaning of "regular rate," (4) uncertainty in meaning of "work week" and "time worked." These matters are of a highly
technical nature and no good purpose would be served in outlining them in
detail. Suffice it to say that the need for improvement is a real and pressing
need.
The remedies which have been discussed relate in large measure to legislative matters. Herein lies a danger. We cannot expect a cure-all to come
from Congress. No law is any better than its administration. In the final
analysis capital and labor must work out their differences by voluntary agree-
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ment and not under the. compulsion of governmental edict. This requires a
mutual understanding and a mutual recognition of the problems of each. All
this must be done within the framework of our political democracy and of
our capitalistic economy.
To the extent that we as lawyers can assist in such a solution we owe a
definite duty to our profession and to the public. If no solution is found,
then we must reconcile ourselves to some form of collectivist state. And if the
country turns to collectivism what will become of labor unions, employers,
lawyers and bar associations?

Our Returning Lawyer Veterans
J.

HARTLEY MURRAY, major, Judge Advocate General Department, served
from March 1942 to October 1946 in the United States and in Europe. He
was a member of the staff of Mr. Justice Jackson, U. S. Chief Prosecutor at
the Nuremberg trials. He has returned to practice as a member of the firm of
Murray, Baker & Wendelken, Mining Exchange Bldg., Colorado Springs.

Denver Bar Holds Tax Institute
The Denver Bar Association held a very successful tax institute on December 12th and 13th. The afternoon sessions of both days were devoted to
a comprehensive analysis of the proper method of and problems encountered
in the filling out of individual income tax returns. Thomas Girault, Chief
Field Deputy, from the Denver office of the Collector of Internil Revenue,
and John H. Daly and Byron C. Godfrey, special instructors, conducted the
sessions, and the thanks of the Denver lawyers goes to them for their most
excellent presentation of the subject.
In the Thursday evening session, Donald G. Kirk, Assistant Trust
Officer of the Colorado National Bank, gave a very excellent discussion of
income tax problems in an estate or trust, and Louis A. Hellerstein, Denver
lawyer, made an excellent presentation of the problems encountered in the
buying and selling of a business. On Friday evening, T. Raber Taylor, J.
Churchill Owen and Richard Tull, discussed tax problems of incorporation.
The Tax Committee of the Denver Bar Association which arranged the
program are: T. Raber Taylor, chairman, and Albert J. Gould, Stephen H.
Hart, Louise A. Hellerstein, Harry Alexius King, William R. Newcomb and
Richard Tull.

Denver District Judges Assigned
Judge Joseph J. Walsh will be the presiding judge of the civil division
of the Denver District Court in 1947. Judges Henry S. Lindsley and Joseph
E. Cook are assigned to the criminal division at West Side Court. Judge
Robert W. Steele, who has been sitting in the criminal division will return to
Judge Lindsley's division of the civil division.

